Money, Sovereignty and the modern Greek state by Prineas, Peter
History
Peter Prineas
Money, Sovereignty and the modern 
Greek state
Introduction
Inspired by the examples of the American and French revolutions, the 
Greek people rose up against the Ottoman Empire in 1821. They endured 
years of war and suffering to win their own sovereign state.
This is a story that every Greek knows. It is perhaps not surprising, 
then, that in the recent financial crisis, when the Troika of the IMF, the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank, dictated terms to 
Greece, protestors marched in Athens.
When calls came from Berlin for a commissioner to supervise the 
country’s finances, Minister Evangelos Venizelos said the proposal ignored 
“some key historical lessons” 1 . Calls for Greece to leave the European Mon­
etary Union -  the euro -  were met with indignation.
Mr Venizelos did not elaborate on the relevant “key historical lessons”, 
but Greece has seen financial crises and foreign interventions before. Its 
sovereignty has been compromised before. Greece has even been previously 
expelled from a monetary union.
That these things have happened before is not a reason to be uncon­
cerned about the present crisis, but it always better to see events in per­




Greece in the 19th Century
Great power intervention in the affairs o f modern Greece began dur­
ing the War o f Independence. Indeed, Greeks invited it with the Act o f Sub­
mission, a petition to place insurgent Greece under the protection o f Great 
Britain. It was sponsored by the English Party in Greece who believed that 
Britain’s naval presence in the Mediterranean made her the obvious great 
power patron for Greece 2.
Although the petition was rejected, there did begin at this time an un­
equal relationship with Britain that would endure for 120 years, sometimes 
to Greece’s benefit and sometimes to her cost.
Greece’s finances during the War o f Independence were chaotic. Two 
loans to the provisional Greek government were raised on the London Stock 
Exchange. It was expensive money and according to the historian George 
Finlay a lot was wasted3. The Greek government was in default in the repay­
ment o f these loans for more than half a century.
Greece became a sovereign state because o f foreign intervention. It 
was made possible when British, French and Russian warships destroyed 
the Turco-Egyptian fleet at Navarino; and when Russia went to war with 
the Ottoman Empire the following year. The British Foreign Secretary and 
the ambassadors o f France and Russia, met often to define and bring into 
existence the new Greek state. A French army brought order to the Pelopon- 
nese 4.
A constitution framed in 1827 declared that sovereignty inhered in 
the nation, from which all power derived 5.
The assassination o f Capodistrias, the first Governor o f Greece, raised 
the question o f its future rule. Britain feared that a tributary Greek state 
might fall under Russian influence and so favoured a fully sovereign Greece. 
Here we can see the beginning o f Britain’s efforts through diplomacy and 
war to contain Russia, a geo-political strategy that extended far beyond 
Greece and became known as “the Great Game”. It continues today. Its more 
recent manifestations include the Cold War and NATO.
The Powers agreed that the new Greek state should be a monarchy. 
They chose Otto, a Bavarian Prince, to be its king. The new “monarchical 
and independent state” was placed under the guarantee o f these “Protecting 
Powers” who also helped to finance it. A three-man Regency ruled Greece 
until Otto came of age, a regime that has been termed the ‘Bavarokratia’.
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Interestingly, the three Regents are described by historian Thomas Gallant 
as a Troika 6.
Under Otto, the Powers forced cuts in the civil service and the army in 
their efforts to secure repayment of the loans they guaranteed. They threat­
ened to take direct financial control 1. In 1857 they set up a Commission 
to inquire into Greece’s finances. Intervention was resented by the Greeks 
then, no less than today.
A pattern was set for persistent great power intervention in Greek 
affairs. In the case of Britain this extended to gunboat diplomacy, begin­
ning in 1850 when the British Navy blockaded Athens over the payment of 
£8000 worth of compensation to Don Pacifico, a British subject resident in 
Greece 8.
The Powers selected King Otto’s successor -  a young prince from 
Denmark. A popular plebiscite was allowed in Greece in which this Danish 
prince garnered just a handful of votes out of a possible 241,000 - less even 
than the votes for a republic - yet his accession to the throne as George I 
was confirmed9.
Under a new constitution adopted in 1864 Greece was termed a 
“crowned democracy” and all power was declared to derive from the people. 
In theory the people were sovereign 10.
Greek politics in the 19th century was highly personal with parties 
forming around powerful personalities rather than platforms. It was also 
dynastic: a forebear who had fought in the War of Independence was an 
asset to a political career. Historian Richard Clogg writes: “The state and its 
attendant offices were prizes to be captured by rival cliques of politicians ... 
there was little sense of collective loyalty to, or trust in, the state or its in­
stitutions. Voters expected those for whom they had voted to help them to 
secure employment” n. Clogg also mentions that Greek politics at this time 
were distorted by “the lavish dispensation of favours”, by “open bribery” 
and by “fraud” 12. These charges have some resonance in today’s crisis.
After more than half a century as a defaulting borrower, Greece at last 
regularised its foreign debts in 1878. The lenders took what today would be 
called a “haircut” -  the agreed settlement sum of £1.2 million was much less 
than the nominal capital and accumulated interest13.
In the final decades of the 19th century, the moderate Trikoupis 
inspired some confidence, and Greece was able to raise loans in the in
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ternational money markets. However, the creditors made the Government 
pre-commit specific revenues from customs and state monopolies to debt 
repayment14. Greece was still seen as a poor risk, so the nominal amounts 
of the loans were discounted by up to 30%.15.
This was a time of some economic progress. Railways and telegraph 
lines were built, merchant shipping increased and the Corinth Canal was 
opened.16.
In the 1890s there was a crash in the price of currants, Greece’s ma­
jor export crop. Greece was in effect forced to declare bankruptcy. Emigra­
tion increased enormously at this time. From 1890 to 1914 some 350,000 
Greeks left. Most went to the USA and their remittances home helped 
Greece’s balance of payments 17.
Greece blundered into a disastrous war with Turkey in 1897. The 
peace terms were moderate due largely to the influence of the Powers, but 
again there was foreign intervention in Greece’s affairs. An International 
Financial Control Commission was established to oversee the repayment 
of Greece’s external debts. This Commission took direct control of specified 
state revenues. Members of the Greek parliament protested that the Com­
mission effectively suspended the country’s independence.18.
The Latin Monetary Union
Before leaving the 19th century I will mention Greece’s involvement in 
an earlier European monetary union.
In 1865, France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland formed the Latin 
Monetary Union and agreed to mint their national currencies at a standard 
weight of silver or gold and make them freely interchangeable. The original 
four nations were joined by Greece and Spain in 1868, and some other coun­
tries joined later.
The Latin Monetary Union allowed a Greek trader, for example, to ac­
cept Italian lire for his goods with confidence that they could be converted 
back to a comparable amount of drachmas. As well, the gold and silver coins 
of each country were made legal tender throughout the Union.
Greece’s weak economy led Greek governments to reduce the amount 
of gold in drachma coins in violation of the Union agreement. Greece was 
expelled from the Latin Monetary Union in 1908. It was readmitted in 
1910, but by then the Union was nearing the end of its life 19.
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Greece in the early 20th Century
The early years of the 20th century saw the rise of Eleftherios Venize- 
los, an able reformer and westerniser. Greece enjoyed a brief belle epoque. 
There was a degree of political unity which contributed to success in the 
Balkan Wars and the realisation of a large part of the Megali Idea.
Greece almost ceased to be a sovereign state during the First World 
War due to the interventions of the Entente or allied powers. Her neutral 
status under King Constantine was disregarded. Control of the posts and 
telegraphs was seized. Ambassadors unfriendly to the Allies were forced out 
of the country. Athens was at one point invaded by Allied troops and Thes­
saloniki was occupied. Greek ports were blockaded by British and French 
warships. The Ethnikos Dichasmos or National Schism, produced by the 
War, saw purges by both Royalists and Venizelists of their opponents that 
embittered Greek politics for decades. The Allies promoted an alternative 
government led by EleftheriosVenizelos and eventually forced Constantine 
from the throne 20.
When Constantine returned in 1920, the Powers cut Greece off from 
international money markets. Tens of millions of pounds in credit in sup­
port of Greece’s effort to subdue the Turkish Nationalists, was withdrawn. 
Money to continue the war in Asia Minor had to be extracted from the 
Greek people by means of a forced loan21.
Greece was soon mired in the economic crisis of the 1930s. Venizelos 
complained that the nation would have been solvent if the 40 million gold 
pounds of credit promised by the Allies had not been denied when Constan­
tine returned n .
When the world economic depression was at its height, agricultural 
exports, emigrant remittances and receipts from shipping all fell. Greece 
had raised loans on international markets to cope with a million refugees 
from Asia Minor and about two thirds of the state budget went in servicing 
foreign debt. The result was that Greece defaulted on her interest payments 
as she had done in 1893. The country slid into dictatorship under the rule 
of Metaxas 23.
Greece lost its sovereignty during the Second World War. A quisling 
government was installed by the German and Italian occupiers and the 
country was blockaded by the British Navy.
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When George Papandreou and his government of national unity land­
ed in Greece in October 1944, there was enormous inflation. Gold sover­
eigns shipped into Greece by Britain to fund the resistance were the only 
usable currency. One sovereign was worth 170 trillion drachmas. British 
forces effectively ran the Greek government. A British Economic and Finan­
cial Mission sought to assist in post war reconstruction, but Britain could 
not sustain the effort24.
In March 1947 the Truman Doctrine for containing the spread of So­
viet communism was declared in the USA. Greece became a front line state 
in the Cold War. An American Mission of Aid to Greece (AM AG) was estab­
lished. Between 1947 and 1950 over $1.2 billion in aid was granted, most of 
it directed to defeating the communist forces in the Greek Civil War. AMAG 
officials had the power to veto Greek government decisions. AMAG chief, 
Elliot Griswold, was described as the most powerful man in Greece. AMAG 
was close to being a shadow government and some have termed this period 
the “Amerikanikokratia” 25.
There was a flagrant intervention in domestic politics when the US 
Ambassador advocated a change in the electoral system, backed by a veiled 
threat of aid cuts. The Right, in the form of Papagos’ Greek Rally, won a huge 
majority in the 1952 election with the help of the new system of simple 
majority elections. Conservative governments ruled Greece for eleven years 
and the foundations were laid for a free enterprise and consumer society26.
By the early 1960s, Greece’s exports of manufactured goods exceed­
ed agricultural exports for the first time. Tourism was helping to correct 
Greece’s chronic imbalance of payments as were remittances from Greek 
emigrant workers in West Germany and Australia 27.
In the 1960s, the storing of nuclear weapons at US bases in Greece 
questioned the nation’s sovereignty and became a major political issue. So­
viet leader Nikita Kruschev inflamed the debate with his threat to blast the 
Acropolis out of existence 28.
A period of instability began which saw the rise of an extreme right- 
wing ‘para-state’, the fall of George Panadreou’s Centre Union government, 
the Dictatorship of the Colonels and the end of the Greek monarchy. But 
Greece came under no great pressure from Europe due to US influence. 




US and particularly CIA involvement in the regime of the Colonels, 
followed by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, alienated many Greeks. After 
the fall of the Colonels the status of the four American bases in Greece was 
resolved by the Karamanlis government. Henceforth they would be Greek 
installations with a Greek commander and not able to be used for war pur­
poses without the express consent of the Greek government30.
The idea of state sovereignty
A brief examination of the idea of state sovereignty is useful at this 
point.
The central idea of a ‘sovereign state’ is that of a monopoly on the le­
gitimate use of violence, within a particular territory. This idea dates from 
the Peace of Westphalia, a series of treaties made in 1648 which brought 
to an end the Thirty years War and the even longer war Between Spain and 
Holland. These treaties ushered in a new political order in Europe in which 
interference within the territory of a sovereign was no longer to be contem­
plated 31.
However, over the course of the 20th century, Westphalian sovereign­
ty has tended to be dismissed as “an illusion” 37, mere ‘magic’ 33 and “largely 
without basis” 34.
One writer has said that the attributes of sovereignty have been 
violated from the beginning of modern sovereignty discourse and contin­
ue to be violated. There has never been a time when they were universally 
honoured35.
During the 20th century a new discourse developed around “pooled 
sovereignty” as exemplified by the European Union, “shared sovereignty” 
between territorial state and international bodies, and of “supranational 
regional regimes” 36.
The emergence of the European Union (EU) has been described as “a 
particularly flagrant violation of Westphalian national sovereignty as it has 
involved the development of powerful authority structures operating out­
side national territorial boundaries” 37.
Some see dangers in the erosion of state sovereignty. The former World 
Bank chief economist, and Nobel Prize-winner, Joseph Stiglitz, suggests 
that international bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO),
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the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have “seized 
power” 38. Stiglitz states:
“Countries are effectively told that if they don’t follow certain conditions, the 
capital markets or the IMF will refuse to lend them money. They are basically 
forced to give up part o f  their sovereignty, to let capricious capital markets, 
including the speculators whose concerns are short-term, rather than 
long-term growth o f  the country and the improvement o f living standards, 
‘discipline’ them, telling them what they should and should not do” 39.
Stiglitz also suggests that loss of sovereignty may threaten national 
cultures. He characterises a globalised world as one that accepts the dictum, 
“If McDonald’s triumphs, so be it.” In identifying the importance of the 
sovereign state for national culture, Stiglitz has a point. Wars are fought 
over culture, and nations that lack a sovereign state, like the Kurds and the 
Basques, show much interest in acquiring one 40.
What is the European Union?
The EU is the only clear example of a supranational regional regime, 
and as suprastate regimes are thought to be the way of the future, it has at­
tracted much scholarly attention 41.
A long line of case decisions by the European Court of Justice fused 
three separate European treaties and communities into one. This European 
Community took the title of the European Union at the end of 1993, as a 
result of the Treaty of Maastricht42.
There has been much debate about the nature of the EU. The members 
agreed at Maastricht in 1992 to call it “an ever closer union”. Some schol­
ars have declared it to be “a polity” although usually qualifying the term: 
“contested polity”, “multi-level polity”, “compound polity” 43 and “a nascent 
federated polity” 44.
EU law is now able to place limits on the treaty-making powers of 
member states. The EU speaks for its member states in WTO negotiations 
and other international forums. Topics covered by EU treaties include com­
petition, intellectual and commercial property, public procurement, state 
aid, telecommunications, banking, financial services, company accounts 
and taxes, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, consumer pro­
tection, health and safety, transport, environment, research and develop­
ment, social welfare, education and even political participation 45.
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Greece and the European Union
Greek governments in the 1950s were wary of integration with Europe. 
They saw that in the less developed states growth needed to precede union. 
A Greek government ‘White Book’ of 1959 expressed concern that if this 
did not happen there would be a widening of the gap between rich and poor 
countries which “would lead to the political disintegration of Europe” 46.
From the start Greece saw the need for economic convergence. Greece 
made definite proposals to achieve this: a European Investment Bank and 
a Readjustment and Development Fund to finance infrastructure works in 
the less developed countries 47.
But Greece also feared the exclusion of less developed countries from 
a united Europe 48. Greece was vulnerable as it shared borders with three 
communist countries and 25% of its exports went to the eastern bloc. The 
communist model was able to be presented in this period as a successful 
alternative to capitalism49.
The Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, was a Macedonian 
Greek, and sensitive to Slav-communist designs on Macedonia and Thrace. 
In 1958 the United Democratic Left Party, widely regarded as a front for the 
banned Greek Communist Party, became the official Opposition. Associa­
tion with the European Economic Community (EEC) was seen as a way of 
lessening the communist threat to Greece 50. It would divert Greece’s trade 
with the eastern bloc to western markets and reinforce bonds with NATO 
allies. The EEC was seen as an economic manifestation of NATO. Associa­
tion with the EEC was also seen as a way to spur Greece to modernise its 
industry and meet the challenge of competition51.
The Left on the other hand feared Greece could be overrun by foreign 
monopolies, that industry would collapse without protection, and that ag­
riculture would not compete. The Left predicted that Greece would be “a 
drawer of water and hewer of wood, serving the west Europeans as a source 
of raw materials and as a market for their products” 52.
Greece’s Association Agreement with the EEC led to tariff reductions 
that harmed its economy. The lower tariffs hurt Greece’s industry and its 
agriculture was denied the subsidies available to EEC member states53.
However, by the 1970s the EEC was forming into a European union 
and potentially a counter to the two superpowers. This made it attractive to 
Greeks, many of whom had become decidedly anti-American after US and
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CIA involvement in the dictatorship of the Colonels, and US and NATO tol­
erance of Turkish aggression, culminating in the Cyprus invasion. Joining 
Europe was seen by the Right and Centre as guaranteeing the recent return 
to democracy and ensuring political stability. Economic considerations took 
second place.
The Left on the other hand saw the EEC as “The other face of NATO” 54 
and a junior partner to the USA. It saw Greece as:
"...a peripheral country in the world capitalist system ... its integration into 
the European Community o f developed ‘core’ countries could only take place 
on unequal terms, resulting in a distorted development pattern for Greece. 
Thus only national independence, defined as non-alignment, would permit 
balanced growth and safeguard democracy” 55.
Greek accession was accepted in Brussels on primarily political 
grounds: to safeguard Greece’s democracy; as a “political responsibility”; 
and because refusing it would be a denial of the principles on which the 
European Community was founded56.
Karamanlis pushed through Greece’s application, arguing that the 
country was disadvantaged by its Association agreement with the EU and 
this could only be resolved by accession. The role of Karamanlis in Greece’s 
entry to the EC was decisive.
Greece had “for centuries, as part of the Byzantine and Ottoman Em­
pires and under the influence of the Orthodox Church, belonged to a po­
litical and cultural world that was essentially non-western. PASOK’s call for 
national independence and ‘Greece for the Greeks’ resonated against New 
Democracy’s slogan: ‘We belong to the West’ “ 57.
Greece became a full member of the EC on 1 Jan 1981. In government 
PASOK moderated its stance on the EC. Even before this its leader, Andreas 
Papandreou, had sought to satisfy his political following with rhetoric, at­
tacking the government for surrendering national sovereignty without a 
referendum, and complaining that crucial economic decisions would now 
be taken in Brussels ... “to make the poor poorer, and the rich richer” 58.
PASOK nevertheless correctly identified the fundamental division 
within the EC, between the “core” of developed northern countries and the 
under-developed southern “periphery”. It saw that as a peripheral economy, 
Greece could not compete. When it won office, PASOK sought increased 
transfers of resources to the less developed states 59.
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The EC did allow more resources to flow to Greece under its Integrated 
Mediterranean Programs60. At this point PASOK ceased to demand a Greek 
exit from the EC, stating that the costs of withdrawal outweighed the ben­
efits61. An optimistic view was taken of the EC. It was seen as potentially 
evolving into a “Europe of the peoples”. This hope is yet to be realised as 
laws and policies emanating from Brussels continue to suffer from a lack of 
democratic legitimacy62.
After the major political groupings in Greece agreed on Greece’s place 
in Europe, stagnation seems to have set in. The traditional Greek politics of 
highly personal, patron - client relationships, and distrust of the state and 
its institutions, made reform difficult. The Greek leadership did not have the 
stomach for it. After Maastricht, the EU was distracted by the absorption of 
former eastern bloc countries and by the unification of the two Germanys.
In government, PASOK did resist changes to voting that might weaken 
the veto power of small states, predicting a “two-speed Europe in which the 
powerful and affluent will rule and make decisions”.
Decades later, in 2011, it seemed as if this prediction had come true, 
as television audiences around the world watched Merkel of Germany and 
Sarkozy of France -  popularly termed Merkozy -  addressing joint press con­
ferences as the de facto leaders of Europe.
Conclusion
It can be seen that in its 180 year history, Greece’s sovereignty has 
often been compromised, that a sovereign debt crisis is nothing new in the 
history of the modern Greek state, and that Greece has already ceded a sub­
stantial part of its sovereignty to the European Union.
Security was the overriding motivation for Greece’s entry to the Euro­
pean Union. There were early misgivings by both sides of Greek politics as to 
the effects on Greece’s sovereignty and economic competitiveness. The con­
cerns about Greece’s inability to compete were shared in Brussels. Some ac­
tion was taken to address Greece’s problems, and steps were taken towards 
economic convergence, but not enough was done, either in Brussels or in 
Athens. The problems were magnified with Greece’s adoption of the euro.
It remains to be seen whether Europe can make the difficult adjust­
ments needed to achieve the “ever closer union” contemplated at Maas­
tricht in 1992.
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